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Philosophical-Political Profiles, by Jtirgen Habermas 
trans, by Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1983. Pp. 211. Reviewed by David Ingram, Uni-
versity of Northern Iowa. 
Thanks to Frederick Lawrence and MIT Press, many of 
Habermas's hitherto neglected studies of contemporary 
German philosophy are now available to an English-
speaking audience. This translation comprises a selec-
tion of essays taken from the revised edition of Phi-
losophisch-Po1itische Profiles (1981), which contains 
material originally published under the same title 
(1971) as well as articles published in Kultur und 
Kritik: Verstreute Aufsatze (1973) and in other jour-
nals. Among the essays contained in the German edition 
that were not included in the English version are some 
of Habermas's earliest efforts as a student, the most 
significant being his review of the 1953 edition of 
Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics (see "Zur 
Veroffentlichung von Vorlesungen aus dem Jahre 1935" 
(1953)). The absence of these essays is particularly 
regrettable since they chronicle Habermas's early in-
volvement with Sche1ling and Heidegger--at 24 Habermas 
could still maintain that Sein und Zeit was "the most 
significant event since Hegel's Phanomenonologie" and 
that one must "think with Heidegger against Heideg-
ger"—and because they foreshadow the direction of his 
later thought. Apparently, the editors decided to 
limit themselves to one essay per literary figure (the 
revised German edition, for example, contains four es-
says on Marcuse alone). Despite these shortcomings, 
the English edition does give the reader an opportunity 
to savor a representative sampling of Habermas's less 
theoretical oeuvre spanning two decades. 
In the preface to the first German edition Habermas 
described the earliest among these contributions as a 
product of a quite bourgeois style of journalism which 
were written in honor of notable philosophers or in 
response to significant publications in the field. 
Many of these essays belong to an era in which German 
Philosophy was stamped by the dominant personalities of 
individual thinkers—an era, Habermas believed, that 
ended in the sixties when changes in political climate 
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called for interdisciplinary research strategies. 
Thus, while all of the essays in this collection are 
marked by a disdain for commentary and an overriding 
concern with the subject matter as a vehicle of self-
clarification—a style of criticism exemplified by 
Habermas's Literaturberlchte on Marx and Marxism (1957) 
and on the logic of the social sciences (1967)—those 
written after 1963 display evidence of the sort of in-
terdisciplinary theorizing that has been the hallmark 
of Habermas's philosophy in recent years. 
It would be futile to attempt a summary of this en-
tire volume, let alone a single essay. However, a 
brief list of the principals discussed—Heidegger, 
Bloch, Lowith, Adorno, Gehlen, Benjamin, Marcuse, 
Arendt, Gadamer, and Scholem—amply testifies to the 
impressive range of Habermas's thought. The list also 
suggests something of a settling of accounts with the 
past. The manner in which this enterprise is carried 
out varies considerably, from the harsh rebuke in 
"Martin Heidegger: The Great Influence" (1959): 
"Heidegger's thought . . . understands itself just as 
little in relationship to social practice as it does in 
relation to the interpretation of the results of 
science" (p. 60); to the glowing encomium of "Hans-
Georg Gadamer: Urbanizing the Heideggerian Province" 
(1979); "Can a more stark contrast be imagined than 
that between [Heidegger's] turn away from any articu-
late figure of the tradition in the interests of a mys-
ticism of being and Gadamer'8 guest to renew the human-
istic tradition, from Plato to the Renaissance, from 
Vico through Scottish moral philosophy down to the 
Geisteswissenschaften of the nineteenth century . . . 
?" (p. 194). 
In retrospect, these earlier essays may be read as 
criticisms of the sort of abstract theorizing later 
pursued in Habermas's mature philosophy since 1970. 
For instance, Habermas's objection to the formalism of 
Heidegger's existential analysis in Sein und Zeit could 
apply mutatis mutandis to his own theory of communica-
tive action. In both cases a critique of ideology 
rooted in "the history of this situation, to the 
development of the social life context" (p. 57) is ex-
truded in favor of a kind of theory which is more 
suited for exposing pathologies—inauthenticity, nihil-
ism, alienation, anomie, "the colonization of the life-
world," etc.--of a global nature. This criticism had 
been levelled against Jaspers in a way that seems 
prescient in light of Habermas's consensus theory of 
truth: "The demand of Jaspers—in striving beyond ev-
ery doctrinal partisanship to fasten upon a unique 
great partisanship, that of being partisan for reason, 
humanity, truth, and goodness—blunts its own point 
when it accepts the injunction to hold fast not only to 
this partisanship, but to its lack of determinacy" 
("Karl Jaspers: The Figures of Truth" (1958), p. 52). 
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Again, the assertion directed against a Utopian thought 
which "is not as concrete as it pretends to be" ("Ernst 
Bloch: A Marxist Schelling" (1960), p. 74), namely, 
that "only to the extent that it becomes sublated into 
practice, which it has to conceive as the realization 
of itself, will philosophy be able to look over its own 
shoulder and will knowledge of the sort that specula-
tion always claimed to be possible" (p. 75) stands in 
sharp contrast to Habermas's current separation of 
theory and practice. The earlier view of the relation-
ship between theory and practice, which may well have 
been partially inspired by Lowith's reading of the 
Young Hegelian movement in Von Hegel Zu Nietzsche, is 
not necessarily lacking in mature judgment--Habermas, 
for example, already mentions the need to ground Uto-
pian thought in erkenntnisleitende Interesse. Finally, 
in taking exception to L6withrs criticism of modern 
historical consciousness ("Karl Lowith: Stoic Retreat 
from Historical Consciousness" (1963)) he again touches 
upon a difficulty that later resurfaced in Knowledge 
and Human Interests (1968): the relationship between 
natura naturans and natura naturata, between nature 
conceived as the ground of evolution and nature under-
stood as a lifeless, reified domain of mechanistic 
forces. 
The human race, as a component of nature, would 
have to be thought of as no less contingent than 
nature itself, and history would have to be 
conceived as natural history. History would lose 
its contingency to the extent that a progressive 
rationalization could be retrived from the 
aimless growth of technical forces over a reified 
nature and society—in a self-critical way, 
through the rational communication of humans 
about the practical mastery of their fates. (p. 
93) 
The "resurrection of fallen nature" theme expressed 
in the above passage is integral to German Idealism--a 
fact which explains why Habermas, who wrote his disser-
tation on Schelling, could also be attracted to the 
Jewish undercurrents of that tradition. This theme 
crops up in essays on Bloch, Lowith, Adorno, Benjamin, 
and Scholem—all of them tied together by Habermas's 
brilliant study, "The German Idealism of the Jewish 
Philosophers" (1961). The latter explores the mystical 
and rationalistic antipodes of German Idealism that 
resonate in the philosophies of such diverse thinkers 
as Simmel, Buber, Wittgenstein, Rosenzweig, Benjamin, 
Cohen, Husserl, Bloch, Adorno, Marcuse, and Horkheimer. 
What holds true for Bloch's philosophy, Habermas con-
cludes, holds equally true for German Jewish thought 
generally: "Because Bloch recurs to Schelling, and 
Schelling had brought from the spirit of Romanticism 
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the heritage of the Kabbalah into the Protestant philo-
sophy of German Idealism, the most Jewish elements of 
Bloch's philosophy—if such categories have any meaning 
at all—are, at the same time the authentically German 
ones" (p. 40). 
Habermas, of course, later abandoned his Schelling-
ian proclivities and with them, the idea of "resurrect-
ing nature" as an autonomous domain of purposiveness. 
This break is most clearly documented in the two essays 
on Bloch and Lowith, where Habermas already expresses 
deep reservations about the possibility of returning to 
a pre-objectifying, aesthetic or cosmological under-
standing of nature absent any technological violence. 
The problem of reconciling an aesthetic, or totalizing, 
intuition of nature with an objectifying knowledge of 
the same continues to be a source of irritation for 
Habermas, as is borne out by his recent "Reply" (1981) 
to his critics. 
My favorite essay of the bunch is "Walter Benjamin: 
Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique" (1972). 
Habermas does a marvelous job of situating Benjamin's 
aesthetics within the context of his Jewish mysticism. 
It is the latter, he believes, which provides the key 
for understanding the rift between him and Adorno. 
Benjamin anticipated the overcoming of "autonomous" art 
in the Dadaist destruction of its cultic aura, or time-
less, contemplative presence—a thesis later elaborated 
in Marcuse's "The Affirmative character of Culture" 
(1937) under the guise of ideology critique. One of 
the virtues of Habermas's reading of Benjamin is its 
awareness of the underlying distinction between this 
latter form of critique and Benjamin's "rescuing cri-
tique." Benjamin's rescuing critique was based upon a 
mystical philosophy of language which invests meaning 
solely in the mimetic power of names, conceived as ex-
pressions of primal energies and needs. Rescuing cri-
tique has as its aim the violent wresting away of these 
primal meaning contents from the empty continuum of a 
historicity in which they remain lost, as if caught up 
in a repetition of the new as the perpetually same. 
Its modus operandi is not that of reflection—least of 
all emancipatory—which anticipates the Utopian ful-
fillment of cultural ideals. For Benjamin, history is 
not the chronicle of cultural progress, but of continu-
ous decay. Subsequently, recuring critique proceeds by 
way of a conservative, secular illumination of the 
"collective fantasy images deposited in the expressive 
qualities of daily life as well as in literature and 
art" (p. 152). Thus, in opposition to Adorno and 
Marcuse, Benjamin stressed the positive, aura-shat-
tering effects of cinema, radio, and mass-reproduced 
culture as media capable of inciting a collective, 
revolutionary response which was more immediate, i.e., 
physiological in a lived sense, than rational or dis-
cursive . 
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I should like to conclude this brief review on the 
following note. Benjamin's "semantic materialism" once 
again poses the question concerning the relationship 
between nature, or lived experience, and rational eman-
cipation that resides at the heart of Habermas's own 
theory of communicative action. Could it be that prac-
tical reason has its seat in the pre-discursive experi-
ence and rhetoric of everyday life rather than in for-
mal strutures of ideal speech? Such a radical reading, 
however repugnant it may be to Habermas, is nonetheless 
partially vindicated in this remarkable confession: 
Is it possible that one day an emancipated human 
race could encounter itself within an expanded 
space of discursive formation of will and yet be 
robbed of the light in which it is capable of in-
terpreting life as something good? The revenge 
of a culture exploited over millenia for the 
legitimation of domination would then take this 
form: Right at the moment of overcoming age-old 
repressions, it would harbor no violence but it 
would have no content either. Without the influx 
of those semantic energies with which Benjamin's 
rescuing criticism was concerned, the structures 
of practical discourse—finally well establish-
ed—would necessarily become desolate, (p. 158) 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneu-
tics. By Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1982. Sartre's Marx-
ism. By Mark Poster. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982. Reviewed by Howard Ross, Eastern New 
Mexico University. 
A generation ago few students (or even professors) 
of philosophy on either side of the English Channel 
knew very much about the philosophy that was being pro-
duced, studied and debated on the other side. Nor for 
the most part had they any interest in seeking to find 
out. Indeed, they felt in general fully justified in 
their ignorance by a settled conviction of the friv-
olity, superficiality and lack of any rigorous intel-
lectual value of that of which they were accordingly 
more than content to remain ignorant. 
Now—happily—times seem to be changing. On both 
sides of the Channel signs are multiplying of a serious 
desire to learn about what has been and is going on on 
the other side, and even to participate in it. Our two 
books by American professors are an indication of this 
desire. 
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The first book we will discuss is Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. This book was 
born out of a friendly dispute among three university 
professors, John Searle, Hubert L. Dreyfus, and Paul 
Rabinow. In a seminar in which all three were partici-
pants, a dispute arose over whether it was correct to 
characterize Foucault as a typical structuralist. This 
dispute led to the proposal of a joint article, which, 
as time went on, expanded into a medium-length book. 
Michel Foucault: From Structuralism to Hermeneu-
tics was the first title to be considered for their 
study. The assumption underlying this title was that 
Foucault had been something of a structuralist in his 
early works, The Order of Things and The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, but had moved to a more hermeneutic position 
in his later works on prisons and human sexuality. 
After receiving little, if any, support for this title, 
the authors moved to consider a second one. 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneu-
tics became the title of their study. The authors 
received a great deal of support for this title, even 
from Foucault himself, who assured the authors that 
even though he once considered structuralism as the 
most advanced position in the human sciences, he did 
not consider himself as ever having been a structural-
ist. 
Comparisons made between Foucault*s early work and 
structuralism does not hold for his later . work. Ac-
cording to the authors, during the 1970's Foucault's 
work has been organized around developing a new method 
of analysis in the human sciences. This new method, 
which the authors call interpretive analytics, includes 
the best features of both structuralism and herme-
neutics. It takes into account structuralism's claim 
to be an objective science and hermeneutic's counter-
claim that the human sciences can only proceed by sub-
jectively understanding the deepest meanings of the 
human subject and his tradition. 
The authors of this study are two University of 
California professors, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow. Dreyfus is a professor of philosophy at the 
University of California at Berkeley, and is the author 
of What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason, while Rabinow, a professor of anthropology at 
the same university, is the author of Symbolic Domina-
tion: Cultural Forms and Historical Change in Morrocco 
and Reflections of Fieldwork. 
The authors say their book is the first to offer a 
systematic analysis of Foucault's work as a whole. I 
believe there exists one other book which could equally 
make the same claim—Alan Sheridan's Michel Foucault: 
The Will To Truth. I find it hard to understand why 
the authors did not make some use of the Sheridan book, 
especially since it deals with some of the same topics. 
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Nevertheless, the authors issue a stern warning to 
not consider their book as a biography, a pyscho-
history, an intellectual history, or as a digest of 
Foucault's thought, although they admit, elements of 
the last two are, of course present. They claim that 
their book should be considered as a special reading 
(symptomatic?) of Foucault's work, bearing in mind a 
certain set of problems (problematic?). 
Their purpose in writing this book is to, not only 
elucidate Foucault's correct relationship to both 
structuralism and hermeneutics, but to show, as well, 
how Foucault's methodological approach can be used by 
us to study human beings, and, more importantly, teach 
us what to learn from such a study. As far as the 
authors are concerned, Foucault's approach is on the 
whole superior to phenomenology, structuralism and her-
meneutics, in studying human beings. These three mod-
ern approaches have not lived up to their self-
proclaimed expectations. 
In so far as the structure of Michel Foucault; 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics is concerned, the 
authors divide it into two large sections, with each 
section corresponding to Foucault's early and later 
periods: Part I: The Illusion of Autonomous Dis-
course, and Part II: The Genealogy of The Modern Indi-
vidual: The Interpretive Analytics of Power, Truth, 
and The Body. 
Part I is concerned with Foucault's early efforts 
towards developing an archaeological method to prove 
that' knowledge and language obey the same underlying 
structural laws. The authors discuss both Foucault's 
efforts at systematically outlining archaeological 
analysis in his Archaeology of Knowledge and the metho-
dological failures of archaeological analysis, which 
had the effect of leading Foucault into a self-imposed 
silence that is finally broken by the publication of 
two books in which he tries to deal with some of the 
failures of archaeological analysis. 
One way in which Foucault deals with the failures 
of his early archaeological analysis is by developing a 
new method, one the authors call "interpretive analyt-
ics." Interpretive understanding of human society can 
only be obtained by someone who shares the actor's in-
volvement, but distances himself from it, not totally 
like archaeology. This person must undertake the hard 
work of diagnosing and analyzing the history and organ-
ization of current cultural practices. The resulting 
interpretation is a pragmatically guided reading of the 
coherence of the practices of society. According to 
the authors, Foucault is not trying to construct a new 
theory of society, or construct a general theory of 
production. Rather, he is offering us an interpretive 
analytic of our current situation. It is, they say, 
Foucault's unique combination of genealogy and archae-
ology that enables him to go beyond theory and herme-
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neutics and yet to take problems seriously. Unlike ar-
chaeology, the practitioner of interpretive analytics 
realizes that he himself is produced by what he is stu-
dying; consequently he can never stand outside it. 
All things considered, I found this to be an excel-
lent book. It offers a logically clear discussion, 
free of unnecessary jargon, of Foucault's work. This 
book has another added advantage in that it was written 
in close consultation with Foucault himself. This is 
by far the best book on Foucault's very difficult, but 
highly original thought. 
The second book, Sartre's Marxism, by another 
University of California professor, Mark Poster, again 
explores the work of a French social theorist, this 
time the late Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre is described by 
Poster as perhaps the leading western intellectual of 
his time, a description, I'm sure, most will not dis-
pute. Sartre's genius is attested to by the fact that 
he has written highly influential works in an awesomely 
diverse variety of subject areas: philosophy, litera-
ture, biography, autobiography, history, and marxism. 
Poster's book deals with Sartre's contributions to the 
latter two subject areas. 
Sartre's Marxism is a short, but concisely written 
book, which tries to clarify the theoretical problems 
of Sartre's marxism, and thereby provide the conceptual 
basis for a more comprehensive and more self-conscious 
understanding of history. Poster is not new to this 
subject, a few years ago, he published Existential 
Marxism in Post-War France, followed by The Critical 
Theory of The Family. 
According to Poster, some scepticism might be 
voiced concerning Sartre as a marxist. The French 
thinker remains in some quarters a petty-bourgeois in-
tellectual and in others a respected philosopher of 
pessimism, despair, and anxiety, anything but a prophet 
of revolution. Poster says that these decidely un-
marxist images have pursued Sartre long after he 
aligned himself theoretically with marxism in 1960, es-
chewing his early position in Being and Nothingness. 
From Poster's vantage point, Sartre's politics have 
been anything but a linear rush towards Marx and 
Communism, but since the resistance, however, Sartre 
has been a man of the Left, and even within the Left, 
Poster adds, Sartre has constantly shifted his position 
in relation to both the thought of Marx and to the 
politics of the French Communist Party. 
It is Poster's belief that Sartre has always been a 
radical, if not a leftist or marxist. His early ex-
istentialist writings, The Transcendence of The Ego 
(1936), Nausea (1938) and Being and Nothingness (1943), 
all challenged official liberal culture. His philo-
sophical works, Poster goes on to say, undermined the 
dominant, bourgeois theories of knowledge based on 
rationalism, while his literary, modernist writings op-
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posed the basic assumptions of the classical bourgeois 
novel. Until the Second World War Sartre's thought 
remained "apolitical" and did not confront marxism. 
Poster discusses how the experience of the French 
Resistance changed Sartre's political orientation, that 
being confined in a German prisoner of war camp and 
living in a Nazi-occupied Paris compelled Sartre to 
take sides and he chose the left. From the end of the 
Second World War until the Soviet invasion of Hungary, 
Sartre adapted various positions with respect to marx-
ism both in his writings and in his politics. 
From 1945 to 1957 Sartre wrote numerous essays on 
politics, literature, and marxism, in which he at-
tempted to come to terms with the theory and practice 
of marxism. Poster points out that Sartre's path to 
marxism was blocked by several obstacles: (1) The 
U.S.S.R. (2) The French Communist Party and (3) the 
official marxism of Stalin. 
After the war Sartre, along with his life-long com-
panion Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, who 
exerted a strong influence on Sartre's marxism, estab-
lished the radical journal, Les temps Modernes, as a 
way of providing the base for a viable marxism. 
It was during the late 50s, Poster says, that 
Sartre seriously began the business of developing the 
theoretical concepts needed to reconcile the concept of 
radical freedom in Being and Nothingness with the 
marxist doctrine of historical materialism. In 1957, 
for example, he wrote Search For A Method, foLlowed in 
I960' by volume one of The Critique of Dialectical 
Reason. 
It is these two books, according to Poster, that 
presents a thorough re-thinking of marxist social 
theory, and they also represent a rigorously systematic 
effort, on the part of Sartre, to integrate the valua-
ble parts of existentialism into marxism, which he 
defines as the philosophy of our era. 
Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason presents a 
challenge and an opening for new lines of development 
of marxist theory. The bulk of Poster's book is con-
cerned solely with Sartre's Critique. Poster systemat-
ically explores the extent to which marxist theory can 
benefit from it. 
It is imperative, Poster says, that we use Sartre's 
Critique to reconstitute marxist theory, for the tradi-
tional categories cannot account for changes from clas-
sical to advanced capitalist society, and for certain 
features of pre-capitalist modes of production. Poster 
strongly feels that Sartre's Critique helps overcome 
some of the theoretical deficiencies within the works 
of Marx and Engels concerning the adequacy of these 
positions for a critical social theory, deficiencies, 
he feels, which bear directly on the ability of marxism 
to account for historical development in the 20th cen-
tury. Therefore, we should consider Sartre's position 
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not as a rejection of either Marx or marxism, but as a 
further development and enhancement of the latter. 
These two books are a very encouraging sign. 
Written by English speaking scholars about contemporary 
French thinkers, these two books demonstrate that there 
exists a number of English speaking scholars who are 
keenly interested in continental philosophy. 
Rights and Persons. By A. I. Melden. Berkeley, Uni-
versity of California Press, 1977. Paperback, 1980. 
Pp. 263, with index. $5.95. By William Sweet, Univer-
sity of Ottawa. 
The reprinting in paper covers of A. I. Melden's 
Rights and Persons comes three years after its original 
publication and nearly a decade after the renewal of 
interest in rights following John Rawls's A Theory of 
Justice. Whereas Rawls, however, discusses rights in 
light of a theory of justice, Melden instead focuses on 
rights themselves. His aim is to show that "rights are 
of central interest in morals," and that they may "be 
enjoyed justifiably, not against, but only with human-
ity." Yet Melden does not argue for a rights-based 
moral theory where the rights of persons act as funda-
mental and absolute constraints on action. Rather, as 
in his earlier (1959) essay Rights and Right Conduct, 
and in his more recent article "The Play of Rights" 
(Monist, 1972), Melden's approach is Wittgensteinian, 
though now it is more sympathetic to the work in that 
tradition by Peter Winch and D. Z. Phillips. 
Melden starts with an investigation into the source 
of the obligation of promises, and then examines more 
closely the concepts of "right" and "person," for it is 
on this basis that promises allegedly have moral 
weight. As a result, Rights and Persons addresses, 
besides the obvious issues, a substantial amount of 
recent work in moral philosophy on duty, obligation, 
and promising. Yet this book is not restricted to such 
matters of moral theory for it draws out some of the 
implications of rights on social issues such as wo-
men's, children'3, and animal rights, abortion, eutha-
nasia, and punishment (including capital punishment). 
A brief survey of the book's seven chapters will reveal 
Melden's strategy in his approach to rights and their 
role in morality. 
I 
In the introductory chapter, Melden rejects the as-
sumption involved in what he claims is the traditional 
definition of a right, that is, a reference to what it 
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is right or obligatory to do. Melden believes that 
this assumption predisposes one to a specific concep-
tion of rights. Instead, he raises the question pre-
supposed in such a definition--"What makes an obliga-
tory act obligatory?"--and examines work by Bradley, 
Kant, Ross, Prichard, Rawls, and Davidson, focussing on 
what he takes to be a central case of moral obligation, 
i.e., the moral obligation involved in promising. 
Melden argues that their respective solutions to this 
question are inadequate, and holds that in promising 
one confers a right on another. Consequently, rather 
than rights being based simply on what it is right or 
obligatory to do, moral obligation depends on rights. 
To explain how rights give rise to such obligation, in-
stead of being concerned with right acts and what one 
ought to do, which focus on the promiser, we ought to 
focus instead on the moral background to such cases— 
namely, on the moral relations between the parties 
(22). It is because of these relations, and not just 
something done by the promiser, that promises bind. 
* In "The Obligation of Promises," Melden continues 
the account of the first chapter by arguing that the 
procedure involved in promising is not analogous to 
following the rules of a game, for it does not take 
full account of the relationships on which promising 
depends, and fails to capture the internal "moral" ele-
ment (34). He also rejects both Hume's and Austin's 
accounts of promising, and discusses the issues in-
volved in some "peripheral" cases of promising (e.g., 
death-bed promises). 
Chapter III, "Rights, Personal Relations, and the 
Family," finally completes Melden's account of how 
promises bind. Promises are instances of special 
rights and the authority of these rights is based on 
the fact that they play an essential role in the life 
of an agent. Melden then lists some limits on the ex-
istence and exercise of rights that follow from this 
view (56-57). He also, though briefly, notes the im-
portance of the concept of "person" and rejects what he 
argues is Hume's conception of the person as a common-
wealth or republic (64-66). A more detailed discussion 
of this topic is postponed. 
A portion of this chapter is devoted to a discus-
sion of two issues: how the family is a locus for a 
series of special rights, and how such special rights 
cannot be explained on a Rawlsian view that the family 
is a social institution (70). This criticism is pur-
sued in "Justice, Institutions, and Persons" where 
Melden also addresses Rawls's account of promising. 
Melden purports to show that Rawls's view of rights is 
both misleading, since it is allegedly one of legal and 
political but not moral rights (108), and inadequate, 
since Rawls cannot explain the moral obligation of 
promising on his account of promising as an institution 
following constitutive rules. Melden also draws some 
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parallels between Rawls 1s account of rights and those 
of Bradley and Kant (104-108). 
The fifth chapter, "Rights and Goods," reviews the 
arguments of Prichard and, he suggests, Hart, that the 
good and the right are independent. Melden's position 
is that rights depend on benevolence, a concern for the 
well being of others. (This is used by Melden as the 
basis from which he generates children's rights (147-
157).) Hence there is an essential relation between 
the rights of a person and the needs that persons have 
for assistance. What rights do persons have, then? In 
Chapter VI, "Human Rights," Melden argues that, aside 
from special rights (such as the receipt of promises) 
that one may acquire, humans have a basic inalienable 
right to pursue their interests (167), which presup-
poses the right to life and the right to a moral educa-
tion (so that one may become a moral agent) (184). 
Melden provides a brief catalogue of rights often 
claimed (177-181), relates them to this basis, and then 
turns to the crucial question of what it is about the 
person that accounts for the ascription of rights. 
It is not, Melden suggests, rationality, autonomy, 
intrinsic worth, or any feature each has as an individ-
ual that can provide such a foundation (186-192). 
Rather it is that each is "as fully qualified as others 
to employ the language of morals." As he has said in 
Chapter V, "it is a matter, rather, that involves a 
mastery of a body of discourse by those able to employ 
it in the relevant practical affairs in which they are 
involved with each other" (132). Why is this ground 
sufficient? Here Melden argues simply that "all expla-
nations must come to an end" (200). Rather what one 
must do here is point out that the moral form of life 
entails the existence of human rights. Melden then 
draws out the consequences of this account for our 
moral relations to animals, psychopaths, coma victims, 
and infants, and alludes to implications for abortion 
and euthanasia. 
The final chapter on "Changing Conceptions of Human 
Rights" contains the argument that Locke, unlike Kant, 
makes a significant and praiseworthy break with the 
moral law tradition on the nature and source of rights 
(231). Melden adds, however, that in recent years 
there has been a similar development of our concept of 
human rights beyond the Lockean model, so that we see 
every person's moral interest is that the interests of 
all are protected (237ff.). On this ground, Melden ar-
gues that one must support affirmative action pro-
grammes. 
II 
One of the problems with this book is the diffi-
culty in determining its intended audience. One must 
presume Melden directs it to specialists in moral and 
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political theory. The first part of his work is pri-
marily critical, and Melden attempts a close analysis 
of a number of texts. So, as a specialist volume, one 
can forgive (though not forget) his lengthy sentences 
and the philosophical forays into side issues or other 
skirmishes that pervade the text. The discussions of 
what Locke really meant (13ff.) or the invectives 
against natural law (68), for example, contribute lit-
tle to the development of Melden's position, but may be 
interesting historical notes. 
Yet when it comes to the central chapters of his 
book, on "Human Rights" and "Changing Conceptions of 
Human Rights," the argument is much looser and more 
sweeping, not to mention emotive and, occasionally, 
question begging. This confusion in manner and style 
is, however, one that Melden could have easily avoided. 
His 1972 paper in the Monist, "The Play of Rights," is 
much more readable than the first chapter of Rights and 
Persons which draws almost entirely on this paper. 
A second difficulty with Rights and Persons is that 
some important work on rights is ignored or mis-
represented. First, since the book was originally pu-
blished in 1977, and includes a reference to the Octo-
ber 1976 Journal of Philosophy, one wonders why there 
is no reference to Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State,. and 
Utopia which had appeared in 1974. Clearly Nozick says 
much relevant to the issues Melden raises, for example, 
the source and limits of rights and the plausibility of 
the views of Locke, and is sympathetic to the kind of 
investigation that Melden pursues. Still, Nozick's 
work challenges many of the inferences that Melden 
draws from his theory—especially those that assure us 
that "rights can be enjoyed only with humanity" or that 
rights can be limited by moral considerations that do 
not involve the rights of others. 
Moreover, all of the chapters, save two, of Ronald 
Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously had appeared in print 
before 1977—including an especially significant one, 
"Justice and Rights," in which it is claimed that Rawls 
(contra Melden) allows for fundamental rights as checks 
on institutions. Again, one wonders why Melden omits 
mention of this v/ork. 
Third, Melden refers to idealist ethics and social 
philosophy only a few times, and pays little attention 
to its attempt to provide a substantial alternative to 
the predominant liberal democratic theory. In particu-
lar, his cited source on idealism is only the famous 
note to Essay V of Bradley's Ethical Studies, "Rights 
and Duties." It is not obvious that Bradley's brief 
account is the best exposition of the idealist position 
on rights, and it is certainly not the only one. One 
wonders why Melden did not choose to refer to the more 
extensive analyses of rights given in D. G. Ritchie's 
Natural Rights, T. H. Green's Lectures on the Princi-
ples of Political Obligation, or Bernard Bosanquet^s 
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The Philosophical Theory of the State. At least then 
one could be certain whether all idealists believe that 
the rights of persons can be "collapsed into their du-
ties" (3). 
Finally, it is a common trait of Melden*s analyses 
to exaggerate or distort positions he examines. One 
especially significant instance of misrepresentation is 
Melden1s account of Rawls's views on rights in Chapter 
IV. Here, Melden explains, Rawls's account of rights 
is misleading and fails because an institutional ac-
count of rights can give no proper explanation of the 
obligation of promising (69). Whether Rawls's account 
of promising is adequate is one thing. However it is 
by no means clear that in Rawls's theory rights are 
purely institutional. Melden makes no reference what-
soever to Rawls's extensive account of natural rights 
in Section 77, "The Basis of Equality," of A Theory of 
Justice, nor does he acknowledge the view held by some 
that in Rawls there must be certain pre-institutional 
rights in order for any selection of principles of 
justice to be made. 
Ill 
Aside from these matters, there are also serious 
problems in Melden's treatment of the central topics. 
Given the title Rights and Persons, one imagines that 
the issues of central interest to Melden would be those 
of what a right is, what a person is, and how it is 
that persons have rights. Yet it is not until the 
sixth chapter that Melden's views on human rights begin 
to be discussed systematically. Instead, in three of 
the early chapters, and frequently throughout the text, 
Melden focuses on promising. It is true that Melden 
considers promising to involve rights in a central way, 
but one proceeds slowly through the text wondering 
whether he will ever get to a substantive case of what 
a right is. 
In fact, even when one examines the sixth chapter, 
Melden never gives a definition of what a right is. It 
is true that he says something of what it is to have a 
right (15; 79); he makes mention of a distinction 
between legal or institutional and moral rights; he 
lists some characteristics of rights (e.g., that they 
include positive rights and are more than Hohfeldian 
liberties; that some (human) rights are inalienable and 
do not disappear when infringed or refused, but leave a 
residue; that they are not grounded in moral principles 
or a moral law); and he gives instances, though by no 
means uncontroversial ones, of moral rights. But 
Melden never says specifically what rights are, nor 
specifically how (even by means of example) they can 
count against other moral considerations or how such 
considerations could count against them. One is doubly 
hampered here because Melden also neglects to provide 
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the reader with a clear sense of what he means by 
'moral1 as distinct from, for example, 'conventional'. 
One has the impression that Melden presumes that we 
already know what 'the moral', moral rights, and moral 
considerations are, and that he is just showing some 
implications of views with which we are all very much 
familiar. This is one of several instances of the 
looseness of his argument, and we need to know more 
than this to adopt his view. 
Melden acknowledges as well that there may be no 
widespread agreement about the right thing to do (26; 
159), and argues that there are no priorizing rules, 
that is, rules by which one can rank in advance the 
demands of one moral action against another (17; 159). 
One may sympathize with Melden's reluctance here and 
his wish to avoid viewing morality too abstractly. 
(Melden seems to believe that "reason" could provide 
such decisions of what the right thing to do is (19), 
but does not explain how.) But an essential element in 
making such a determination is, he claims, the ex-
istence of rights. 
Is it really required that Melden introduce ref-
erence to rights? He allows that there are other moral 
considerations besides rights and that talk about 
rights can be irrelevant or inappropriate to some 
questions of what one ought to do. The only clear case 
given for the necessity of rights talk is that of the 
alleged special right involved in promising (i.e., when 
one promises, one gives another a right to a certain 
performance by oneself on which the promisee may base 
his actions), and much of the plausibility of his view 
of rights draws on this specific example for support. 
But what is the relation between the promiser and 
promisee? Melden explains that the promisee has joined 
his life to the promiser in accepting the promise. In 
other words, they have entered a special moral rela-
tionship above and beyond those that people naturally 
engage in so far as they are members of the same moral 
community. 
But then the necessity of reference to rights 
disappears. All one need admit is the fact that there 
exists a moral relationship which is called not a right 
but, in this case, a promise. This still preserves 
whatever focus on the individual Melden might find in 
the notion of right. Moreover, interestingly, it is 
just this—"the moral relations of persons"--and not 
rights which Melden acknowledges to be his subject mat-
ter (29). 
Melden also gives only a vague account of what it 
is to be a person. He notes that the normative status 
of what it is to be a person is essential (28), though 
he declines to address the metaphysical question of 
personhood. Still Melden does hold that a person is 
more than a thing with certain physical or psychologi-
cal attributes and ultimately he can be seen to have 
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three distinct characterizations of persons: (i) that 
they have interests, agency, and have joined their 
Lives with others (seen especially in the case of 
family relations, 146ff.); (ii) they are able to join 
their lives with others and/or have the lives of others 
joined with their own; and (iii) that they are beings 
who, as part of their nature, have a past and future, 
which refers not simply to memory, but also (moral) 
feelings, emotions, and attitudes (216-217). 
Melden introduces the latter two characterizations 
when discussing "hard cases"—cases where we have ob-
vious biological humans, but where some or all of the 
elements of the first characterization are absent. The 
effect of this, and perhaps it is Melden's strategy, is 
that the term 'person' becomes coextensive, if not syn-
onymous, with 'human'. Indeed, he uses the expressions 
'human rights', 'natural rights', and 'rights of the 
person' interchangeably. 
Such a broad notion of "person," however, is not 
only unnecessary for Melden's explicit purposes, but it 
also is questionable and, I think, leads him to deny 
what might otherwise be plausible candidates to whom 
rights could be ascribed. 
First, Melden's apparent justification for these 
latter two characterizations of "moral personhood" is 
that, were this notion not so broad, we could treat 
such "hard cases" in any way we choose. In the first 
place, it does not follow that we can treat a being in 
any way we choose simply because that being is not a 
moral person. Apart from this, then, there seems no 
strong reason why we need consider these hard cases 
"moral persons." Second, while it is plausible, though 
admittedly not uncontroversial, to claim that those 
with interests, agency, and interpersonal relations 
have rights, to claim that all those without these 
characteristics but who either might have them or had 
them but no longer do, is at least much less plausible. 
Indeed, if one adopts this broadened characterization 
of personhood, why even bother with making a distinc-
tion between 'human' and 'person'? What makes these 
"hard cases" so hard, it seems, is simply Melden's 
broad extension of the term 'person'. 
Third, it is this apparent interchangeability of 
the concept of person with the concept of human that 
leads to some puzzles in his view. First, Melden says 
it is "queer to say that animals have rights" (17) un-
less we anthropomorphize them. Regardless of whether 
animals have rights, it is obvious that the issue does 
not hinge on whether we identify animals and humans 
because it is obvious that not all animals are humans. 
The question that even Melden can address is, rather, 
are animals persons at least to the extent that "hard 
cases" are? Of course an animal rights advocate would 
press Melden even further on this point. 
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Moreover, the concept of moral person that Melden 
discusses is one that seems implicitly to be an indi-
vidual, animate, being. But surely it is plausible to 
say that institutions have moral rights (e.g., the 
right of the established government to preserve it-
self), since an institution or government has inter-
ests, can "join its life" with its members, and its 
members can join their lives with it, and so on. 
Melden makes no reference one way or another to the 
possibility of such rights. Given Melden 1s view of the 
person, it is not clear whether he would argue that 
possession of these characteristics could constitute a 
right, but the only obvious ground on which he could 
deny it is the one that institutions are not humans. 
Yet all this would do is simply conflate 'person' with 
'human', and obviously the question here is whether 
such a move would be legitimate. 
How is it that persons have rights? It is central 
to Melden's view that persons are beings with rights. 
Perhaps this is to be obvious to the reader, yet there 
is* still a gap between being, for example, a person 
with interests and having the right to pursue these 
interests. Melden does not provide this bridge. For 
the fact that one can or does join one's life with 
another does not mean that one ought or that others 
should accord this any status in the ascription of 
rights. 
Melden does, however, give more of an explanation 
than this. At times, "human" rights (as distinct from 
special rights) apparently exist in view of something 
about what it is to be a person. We have seen that it 
is not rationality, or autonomy, or any similar single 
characteristic, but something involving agency, having 
interests, or being able to use moral language. Yet 
this defers the need for explanation by putting the 
demand off only for a moment for this does not explain 
how such a foundation is appropriate or adequate. One 
might presume, therefore, that there are underlying 
moral principles, such as moral laws, that justify the 
ascription of rights to such beings. Indeed, the ex-
istence of such principles seems necessary to bridge 
the traditional "is-ought" gap--a gap of which Melden 
is fully aware (185). But though he does talk about a 
moral background for rights (101), it seems as if this 
applies only to special rights and that, in the in-
stance of human rights, he rejects such a possibility. 
The only remaining option seems to be that rights 
are ascribed to persons in view of the place they have 
in the moral community. But Melden rejects this view 
of rights as well, though he does grant that the notion 
of right is significant only so far as it serves to 
restrict or direct the actions of others, and without 
others there is no sense to having a right. 
What remains? In fact it is the first view that 
Melden adopts--that rights are based on "those general 
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and familiar features of the lives of persons which are 
accessible to all of us" (199). But why is this con-
nexion appropriate? Melden simply notes that rights 
rest on "this enormously complicated and moral form of 
human life itself" and that "(i)t is here that all ex-
planations come to an end" (200). Melden's view seems 
to be ultimately that rights can have no additional 
justification for their ascription, because having 
rights is just part of what morality is about—"the 
conception of the right of a human being . . . (can) be 
understood only in terms of its place in the scheme of 
related concepts in which it has its place" (79). But 
short of saying that 'persons have rights' is analytic, 
this claim has no explanatory value. 
Moreover, this frequent Wittensteinian appeal to 
leave things as they are and to allow that there are no 
absolute explanations, even if in principle legitimate, 
seems to acquire an increasing burden throughout Mel-
den's text. In fact, many of Melden's central tenets 
seem to be either an appeal to convention or to some 
deus ex machina. Even though Melden distinguishes the 
moral question of whether human beings have rights from 
the philosophical question of the basis of such rights 
(189), he ultimately ignores this distinction. 
One of the criticisms of appeals to "forms of life" 
as the foundation for religious or moral views is that 
they culminate in an ethical relativism of ghetto 
morality. Given that moral relations do vary or have 
varied from society to society, then if rights arise in 
view of or constitute these relations, not merely 
legal, but moral, rights vary. Moreover, if rights are 
based on the recognition of others as persons—as shar-
ing interests with us, or being capable of joining 
their lives with us—when one believes that there are 
many relevant dissimilarities between oneself and some 
other being, or when one sees no possibility for shar-
ing a life with such an other, it would appear that 
discrimination or abuse is not only justifiable but a 
necessary consequence. Regrettably, Melden addresses 
neither of these issues. 
IV 
Rights and Persons, then, while attempting to ad-
dress some questions of analytic political theory in a 
distinctive way, does not significantly extend prior 
work on rights, for it neither explains clearly what 
"rights" or "persons" are, nor establishes its stated 
aim of showing that rights are of central importance in 
morals. 
I found typographical errors on pages 11, 54, 71, 
80, 91, and 146. 
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